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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LAMONT F. TORONTO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
GEORGE D. CLYDE, A. PRATT
KESLER, CLAIR R. HOPKINS and
the STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10069

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was instituted by plaintiff to determine
the constitutionality of Chapter 148, Laws of Utah 1963
(codified as Chapter 2, Title 63, Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended)), and further to determine the legality of the payment to defendant Clair R. Hopkins of his
salary for the period July 1 through July 15, 1963. The
legislation in question is commonly known as the Finance
Act which was enacted into law in 1963 by the 35th Legislature as Senate Bill No. 48. The basic contention of
plaintiff is that the Act in question invades constitutional
duties of the Board of Examiners and is therefore invalid.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The effect of the judgment entered by the lower court
actually results in the following conclusions:
1. Section 63-2-13 and Section 63-2-15 are unconstitutional insofar as the following language restricts the
constitutional duty of the Board of Examiners to set or reset salary figures for state employees, or to establish rules
for travel expenses:

The board of examiners in conducting any examination of claims shall not have authority to fix, reset
or arbitrarily refuse to pay salaries set by the director of finance or officers' salaries as determined
by agency governing boards. (Section 63-2-13.)
The director of finance shall establish mileage and
travel expense schedules and set up rules and regulations for travel of all state officers, employees
and part-time officials; and such schedules shall
have the force of law in all departments and no
voucher for travel expense shall be paid until the
same has been approved by the director. No obligation shall be incurred for travel outside of the state
without the advance approval of the governor
through the director of finance. Such approval shall
consist of a certification as to the availability of
funds as well as a review of the necessity and desirability of such travel. This provision shall not
apply to the Legislature, legislative committees or
members and employees of the legislative council.
(Section 63-2-15.)
2. Section 63-2-20 is unconstitutional insofar as the
following language restricts the constitutional duty of the
Board of Examiners to exan1ine claims against the State:
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Any examination of claims as may be conducted by
the board of examiners shall be made prior to payment but only after the obligation has been incurred
and an account has been submitted and audited by
the state's accounting officer.
3. Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution of Utah
imposes upon the Board of Examiners a constitutional duty
to examine all claims against the State, including salary
claims to be paid from appropriated funds, and since the
Board did not approve the salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins
for the pay period July 1 through July 15, 1963, in either
a regular or special meeting, such salary payment was unlawful.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants (appellants) seek the following relief on
appeal:
1. As to Section 63-2-13, defendants seek a determination that Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah,
does not give the Board of Examiners the power to set
salaries, re-set salaries, or arbitrarily refuse to permit payment of salaries, and that, therefore, the legislation is valid.

2. As to Section 63-2-15, defendants seek a determination that the authority of the Department of Finance to
review and approve or disapprove requests for travel, and
to establish travel reimbursement schedules and limits, does
not in any way conflict with the constitutional authority
of the Board of Examiners.
3. As to Section 63-2-20, defendants seek a determination that the word "claims" as used in Article VII, Sec-
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tion 13, Constitution of Utah, means only a "claim of right"
when the demand is against appropriated funds, and that,
therefore, the legislation is valid because it does not restrict any constitutional authority of the Board to examine
claims.
4. As to the semi-monthly salary payment to Clair
R. Hopkins, defendants seek a determination that Article
VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, gives to the Board
of Examiners the power to examine claims, but does not
impose upon the Board a duty to examine those claims
which the Board believes do not justify examination, and
that, since the Board in its discretion elected not to examine
the semi-monthly salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins (but
could have done if it had so desired), the payment thereof
was lawful.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues in dispute are purely questions of law. The
facts were in no way in dispute and were stipulated by
counsel and filed with the court as follows :
A. Plaintiff, Lamont F. Toronto, is the duly elected
and qualified Secretary of State of the State of Utah and
a citizen and taxpayer of the State of Utah. Defendant,
George D. Clyde, is the duly elected and qualified Governor
of the State of Utah; defendant, A. Pratt Kesler, is the
duly elected and qualified Attorney General of the State
of Utah; and defendant, Clair R. Hopkins, is the duly appointed and qualified Director of Finance of the State of
Utah.
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B. George D. Clyde, as Governor, A. Pratt Kesler,
as Attorney General, and Lamont F. Toronto, as Secretary
of State, are members of the Board of Examiners of the
State of Utah.

C. In accordance with Senate Bill 48 of the ThirtyFifth Legislature, amending various provisions of Chapter
2 of Title 63, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and known as
Chapter 148, Laws of Utah 1963, Clair R. Hopkins was
appointed Director of Finance by Governor George D.
Clyde at a salary of $14,520.00 payable semi-monthly,
which salary was fixed and determined by the defendant,
George D. Clyde. Such appointment was made July 1, 1963,
which was the effective date of Senate Bill 48.
D. On or about July 15, 1963, the defendant, Clair
R. Hopkins, as Director of Finance and under the authority
of Senate Bill No. 48 and in particular that part of Section 1 thereof amending Sections 63-2-13 and 63-2-20, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, caused the payroll for State employees to be prepared for the pay period July 1 1963 through
July 15, 1963, including the semi-monthly installment of
the annual salary claimed by him as Director of Finance.
E. The semi-monthly installment of the salary
claimed by the defendant, Clair R. Hopkins, was thereafter
paid on a warrant drawn by the Department of Finance
upon the State Treasurer. Prior to the payment thereof,
a summary sheet having attached thereto the payroll for
all State employees for the pay period in question (including the salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins), was presented
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to the plaintiff, Lamont F. Toronto, for his signature of
approval, and he refused to sign his approval; and said
summary sheet with the attached payroll was also presented to defendant, A. Pratt Kesler, who did sign his approval. At the time the summary sheet and attached payroll were presented to. Lamont F. Toronto and A. Pratt
Kesler, Governor George D. Clyde had departed for the
State of Florida to attend a Governor's convention and was
not available to sign said summary sheet. Upon his return
to the State of Utah, but after the warrants in payment
of the payroll had issued, Governor Clyde signed his approval to the summary sheet with the attached payroll. A
procedure which has been adopted and followed by the
Board of Examiners to cover certain situations where
members of the Board are unavailable is attached hereto
as Exhibit A. The Board of Examiners did not consider
or act upon, in any regular or special meeting, the warrants to be drawn to pay the salary claims of individuals
for the period in question. The payroll with the attached
summary sheet was simply circulated to the individual
members of the Board of Examiners in their respective
offices, consistent with past practice.
F. At the time request for payment of said salary
claim was made and at the time of payment thereof funds
sufficient to pay the same were available from the current
budgetary allocations to the Department of Finance of the
funds appropriated by the Thirty-Fifth Legislature of the
State of Utah.
G.

Since the effective date of Senate Bill No. 48 the
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Board of Examiners has not delegated to the Department
of Finance any of its authority to examine, approve or disapprove claims against the State of Utah. In 1941 (See
Exhibit B), 1942 (See Exhibit C) and in 1943 (See Exhibit D) , the Board of Examiners purported to delegate
certain of its authority with respect to the examination
of claims against the State to the Commission of Finance,
the predecessor of the Department of Finance, and since
that time and until the effective date of Senate Bill No.
48, all expenditures and public funds of the State of Utah
have been made in accordance with the procedures outlined in Exhibits B, C, and D.
H. The procedure with respect to the expenditures
of public funds may be outlined as follows :
(1) Prior to the convening of each legislature the
various departments and agencies of the State submit budget requests to the Governor who, with the assistance of
the Department of Finance, formulates a proposed budget
for the ensuing biennium.
(2) Using the budget as a guide but without being
bound thereby, the Legislature determines the amount of
funds to be appropriated to the various departments and
agencies of the State.
(3) Following the enactment of the appropriations
bill or bills by the Legislature, the Governor, with the
assistance of the Department of Finance, allocates the biennial appropriations to the particular departments on a
yearly and quarterly basis.
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(4) When a department or agency of the State requests a disbursement of public funds for a particular purpose the request and the amount thereof are submitted to
the Department of Finance:
(a)
whether
accurate
evidence

The Department of Finance determines
the proposed expenditure is mathematically
and supported by proper vouchers or other
of the amount of the expenditure.

(b) The Department of Finance determines
whether the proposed expenditure exceeds the budgetary allocations to the Department under the particular classification of expenditure allocated in the budget.
(c) Prior to July 1, 1963, if the proposed expenditure was within the appropriated funds of the
Department and the budgetary allocations to the Department, the request was certified as to availability
of funds and passed on to the Board of Examiners,
who approved or disapproved the same.
(d) Since July 1, 1963, the Department of Finance has not only certified proposed expenditures as
to availability of funds, but has further approved or
rejected such proposed expenditures as to their propriety. The Department of Finance contends that from
and after July 1, 1963, it has no duty or obligation to
present the questions of salary figures or salary raises
to the Board of Examiners for its approval. The Department has, however, consistent with past practice,
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presented to the Board for its approval summary
sheets having attached thereto the payroll for all state
employees for a particular pay period, but the Board
has not met to separately consider and approve salary
increases, new salaries and similar matters.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SECTION 63-2-13 IS VALID LEGISLATION.
A.

The Legislature intended to take away certain statutory duties and powers of the Board
of Examiners.

It is helpful initially to put in proper perspective what
the Legislature intended to do in its enactment of Chapter
148, Laws of Utah 1963. There were in fact a group of
companion bills introduced and passed with Senate Bill No.
48, which generally took from the Board of Examiners the
previous statutory duty to examine transactions involving
sales and exchanges of land and various other matters (including payment of claims from appropriated funds), and
which purported to consolidate these general administrative duties relating to the State's finances and property
within the Department of Finance under the supervision
of the office of the Governor. Senate Bill No. 48 as codified recites in Section 63-2-1 that:

"There is created a department to be known
as the department of finance attached to the office
of the governor to assist the governor in the execution of his constitutional duties as the state's chief
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executive officer and which shall perform such duties and functions as may be prescribed by law.
In construing the authorities and duties imposed by
this act, it is the intent of the legislature to define
budgetary functions relating to the approval and
allocation of funds, budgetary control of funds,
prescribing personnel qualifications and salary
schedules, approval of proposed expenditures for
the purchase of supplies and services; and prescribing other budgetary functions under the constitutional authority of the state's chief executive to
transact all executive business for the state, as differentiated from the examination of claims as may
be exercised by the board of examiners." (Emphasis
added.
It is therefore important to note that Senate Bill No.
48 is essentially for the purpose of consolidating and implementing the ad1ninistrative processes for budgeting, allotting, and spending public funds under the general supervision and control of the State's chief executive. Any examination of claims by the Board of Examiners is completely independent from the administrative processes outlined by the act.
It is not denied that the Legislature intended to remove the Board of Examiners from the admnistrative
functioning of the Department of Finance. It is clear that
the Legislature intended such administrative supervision
to be directly under the Governor. Perhaps this legislation
was prompted in part because the Board of Examiners had
previously exercised certain supervision over the administrative procedures of the Department of Finance and perhaps because the Utah Supreme Court had earlier charac-
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terized the Commission of Finance as the "administrative
arm" of the Board of Examiners. See for example, Bateman V. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381
(1958).
B.

Aticle VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah,
does not give the Board of Examiners the
authority to set or re-set salary figures, or
to arbitrarily refuse to permit payment of
salaries.

The lower court found part of Section 63-2-13 to be
unconstitutional as an invasion of the constitutional authority of the Board of Examiners. Section 63-2-13 provides
as follows:
"The director of finance shall prescribe and
fix a schedule of salaries for the officers, clerks,
stenographers and employees of all state offices,
departments, boards and commissions, except where
such salaries are fixed by statute, by appropriation
or where agency governing boards are authorized
by statute to fix the salary of certain officers. The
director of finance must in all cases give certification as to the availability of funds to pay salaries.
The board of examiners in conducting any examination of claims shall not have authority to fix, reset
or arbitrarily refuse to pay salaries set by the director of finance or officers' salaries as determined
by agency governing boards. Such schedule of salaries shall have the force of law in all state offices,
departments, boards and commissions, and shall in
no case be exceeded without the express approval
of the director of finance. No salary schedule shall
be put into effect until approved by the governor."
(Emphasis added.)
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This section was stricken by the lower court to the
extent that the part in italics states that the Board of Examiners shall not fix, reset or arbitrarily refuse to pay
salaries.
Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, provides
that:
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor,
Secretary of State and Attorney-General shall constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners,
which Board shall have such supervision of all matters connected with the State Prison as may be
provided by law. They shall, also, constitute a
Board of Examiners, with power to examine all
claims against the State except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, and perform such
other duties as may be prescribed by law; and no
claim against the State, except for salaries and
compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be
passed upon by the Legislature without having been
considered and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners.
It is difficult to see why the statute offends any constitutional authority of the Board of Examiners. There is
no suggestion, not even the slightest hint, in Article VII,
Section 13, that the Board of Examiners may set or fix,
or reset or refix, salaries. It is true that the Board of Examiners could refuse to permit a salary claim if for some
justifiable reason the claim was not a proper one. But,
the discretion of the Board would be limited to an examination of the validity of the salary .claim and under no
theory could extend to permit establishment of salary rates
to be paid, unless legislation empowered the Board to do
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so. The above section, however, has specifically provided
that the Board of Examiners shall not set salaries.
Since a legislative prohibition against the Board of
Examiners either setting or resetting salaries in no way
conflicts with its constitutional authority, the only remaining question as to the validity of Section 63-2-13 would be
the language which says the Board cannot "arbitrarily refuse to pay salaries.'' This provision can only be unconstitutional if the Board of Examiners has a right arbitrarily
to refuse to pay salaries. There can be no question in this
regard, because this Court has specifically held that the
Board of Examiners cannot act arbitrarily. In State v.
Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 Pac. 1071 ( 1908), this court said
that the Board of Examiners had discretion in allowing
or rejecting claims, "But this discretion is not one that
may be arbitrarily exercised * * * " Further, in
Bateman v. Board of Exa·miners, 7 U. 2d 221, 322 P. 2d
381 (1958), this court said:
"We do not desire to be understood as saying
that Examiners can go so far as to in effect exercise a veto power over legislation by arbitrarily refusing to make funds available which have been
appropriated to Education for either general or
specific purposes. Insofar as this has been done in
certain instances which had considerable bearing
upon precipitating this litigation, such actions were
wrong." (Emphasis added.)
Since the Board of Examiners can make no claim to
any constitutional authority to establish or to reset salaries,
and since this Court has specifically stated the rather ob-
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vious rule of law that this Board cannot act arbitrarily, it
is impossible to see any reason why Section 63-2-13 can
conflict with any constitutional power or authority of the
Board of Examiners. If the section referred to provided
that the Board of Examiners "could not refuse or deny
payment of sa~ary claims," then it is admitted that the
section would certainly be unconstitutional, but the statute
neither says nor suggests any such thing.
POINT II.
SECTION 63-2-15 IS VALID LEGISLATION.
It is not clear why either plaintiff or the lower court
thought Section 63-2-15 was unconstitutional. No mention
was made of that section in any of the pleadings. No reference was made to it in the lower court's memorandum
decision (R. 30-34). The first tilne Section 63-2-15 appeared in this lawsuit was when the final Judgment and
Decree was prepared by plaintiff's counsel and signed by
the judge, wherein paragraph 2 simply recites that Senate
Bill 48 is unconstitutional insofar as it "authorizes the Director of Finance of the State of Utah to process and pay
clailns against the State of Utah * * * without the
examination and approval of the Board of Examiners

*

*

*"

(R. 36).

The judg1nent then declares that "the following provisions of Senate Bill 48" are unconstitutional, and, without
further comment, sets forth Sections 63-2-13, 63-2-15 and
63-2-20 (R. 36-37). Section 63-2-15 simply provides that:
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The director of finance shall establish mileage and
travel expense schedules and set up rules and regulations for travel of all state officers, employees and
part-time officials; and such schedules shall have
the force of law in all departments and no vouncher
for travel expense shall be paid until the same has
been approved by the director. No obligation shall
be incurred for travel outside of the state without
the advance approval of the governor through the
director of finance. Such approval shall consist of
a certification as to the availability of funds as
well as a review of the necessity and desirability of
such travel. This provision shall not apply to the
Legislature, legislative committees or members and
employees of the legislative council. (Section 632-15.)
Since the above statute in no way provides for payment of claims without the approval of the Board of Examiners (and, in fact, does not even refer to the Board), it
is difficult to see why the constitutional authority of the
Board could be impaired by this legislation. If the lower
court thought the Board of Examiners had constitutional
authority to set travel expense rules and regulations and to
establish mileage reimbursement figures, then we consider
the argument under Point I above to be a complete answer
to such a contention. If the lower court thought the legislation was unconstitutional because it prevents the creation
of an out-of-state travel expense "obligation" without prior
approval of the Director of Finance, then we consider the
argument under Point III, infra, to be a complete answer
to such contention.
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POINT III.
SECTION 63-2-20 IS VALID LEGISLATION.
A.

The Legislature has merely defined "claims"
to mean obligations of the State when such
claims are processed administratively by the
Department of Finance, and this definition
does not offend the reasonable meaning of
that word as used in Article VII, Section 13,
Constitution of Utah.

The lower court also found unconstitutional certain
parts of Section 63-2-20, which provides :
"The director of finance shall exercise budgetary control over all state departments, institutions
and agencies. The director shall require the head of
each department to submit to him not later than
May 15th of each year, a work program for the
ensuing fiscal year and may at any time require any
department to submit a work program for any other
period. Such program shall include appropriations
and all other funds from any source whatsoever
made available to said department for its operation
and maintenance and shall show the requested allotments of said appropriations and other funds by
quarterly periods for the ensuing or current fiscal
year by function, division, program or activity
authorized. The director of finance shall review
the work program of each department and shall, if
the governor deems necessary, revise, alter, decrease or change such allotments before or after
approving the same; or, may proceed to make independent allotments which shall be binding on the
said department when a work program is not furnished by any said department as required by this
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section. The aggregate of such allotments shall not
exceed the total appropriations or other funds from
any source whatsoever made available to said department for the fiscal year in question. The director of finance shall transmit a copy of the allotments when approved by the governor to the head
of the department concerned and also a copy to the
auditor of the state. The director of finance shall
thereupon permit all expenditures to be made from
the appropriations or other funds from any source
whatsoever on the basis of such allotments and not
otherwise, unless such allotments or any part thereof are subsequently revised or changed by the director of finance. The director shall examine and
approve or disapprove all requisitions and requests
for proposed expenditures of the several departments, except salaries or compensation of officers
fixed by law in which case the director shall certify
only the availability of funds, and no requisitions
of any of the departments shall be allowed nor shall
any obligation be created without the approval and
the certification of the director. The director shall
employ such budget examiners as may be necessary
to approve allotments and examine the propriety
of all proposed expenditures and facilitate program
planning and management improvement of state
operations. It is the intent of the legislature that
the department of finance shall examine and pass
upon all proposed expenditures. Any examination
of claims as may be conducted by the board of examiners shall be made prior to pay·ment but only
after the obligation has been incurred and an account has been submitted and audited by the state's
accounting officer/' (Emphasis added.)
The language found by the court to be objectionable
was the last sentence which is set forth above in italics.
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That sentence simply provides that any examination, which
the Board of Examiners in its discretion decides to conduct, shall be prior to payment of the claim but after there
has been a pre-audit and an account established so that
there is an obligation created or some right or claim of
right established in favor of the claimant. This amounts
to nothing more than an attempt by the Legislature to
define the word "claims" with reference to State fiscal
procedures. The Board of Examiners in no way is prevented from conducting an examination with regard to any
claims which it may wish to examine, but is simply restricted from an examination of something which is not
yet a claim and is requested to make any such examination
before the claim ceases to become a claim. In other words,
no claim comes into existence until the claimant can assert
a bona fide claim of right, and that cannot occur prior to
some commitment on the part of the State which would
create an obligation or an apparent obligation on the part
of the State. All that the Legislature has done in the
language above quoted is to say that applications, bids,
etc., in the process of preliminary administrative handling
are not claims until some person is hired, some contract
awarded, or until something happens which would purportedly create an obligation.
The other apparent requirement of the legislation under discussion is that the Board conduct any examination
it wishes to conduct prior to payment of a claim. The Legislature has thus said, in effect, that after a claim is paid
it no longer is a claim because the obligation is discharged.
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It is submitted that this unquestionably is a correct statement of the law. While this Court, rather than the Legislature, is the proper entity to construe the meaning of words
and phrases appearing in the Utah Constitution, there is
nothing improper with legislation which properly explains
and defines words in the Constitution for the purpose of
implementing sound fiscal procedures. While it is perfectly
proper for this Court to strike any legislation which improperly construes constitutional provisions, this Court
should not strike legislation which correctly construes portions of the Constitution. Since Section 63-2-20, quoted
above, in effect defines the word "claim" in a manner completely consistent with established law, there is nothing
offensive about the language used in that statute.
B.

The word "claim" is clear and unambiguous,
and means a demand pursuant to an asserted
right.

As already mentioned, the language used in Section
63-2-20 can be offensive only if it is an inaccurate definition of the word "claims" as used and intended by the
framers of the Constitution. All that the Legislature has
done is to establish a time at which a claim comes into existence and a time at which a claim goes out of existence,
and provides that the Board of Examiners, if it wishes to
examine claims, should examine claims, while they are
claims. State fiscal procedures and processes involve a good
many applications, requests, bids, and other preliminary
dealings between the State and prospective claimants which
never ripen into claims. For example, if someone submits
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an application for employment with the State of Utah but
there is no position available, it can hardly be said that such
applicant has a claim against the State; or, if a person submits a bid pursuant to a request for bids and it is found
that such bid is the high bid and nowhere near competitive,
then it can hardly be said that such bidder has a claim
against the State. It is only when the preliminary processes
have proceeded to a point where the claimant can assert
some theory whereby he has a right against the State of
Utah that a claim comes into existence. Similarly, after any
claim of right has been paid by the State, then such claimant no longer has a claim because such claim has been
fully satisfied and discharged.
Since a claim must be considered to be a claim of
right, it is submitted that the language of the statute under
consideration is accurate in reciting that there is no claim
prior to the existence of an obligation by the State nor
after the payment and discharge of such obligation. Therefore, it is completely permissible to recite that the Board
of Examiners conduct its examination after the obligation
is created and before the obligation is paid. If the meaning
of the word "claim'' is so construed, then the language of
the statute as above quoted is not offensive and is not unconstitutional.
While several of the earlier Utah cases discussed the
meaning of the word "claim" as used in Article VII, Section 13, of the Constitution, the most recent and by far
the most liberal definition of that word appears in Bateman v. Board of Examiners, cited supra, as follows:
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"In the first place, we think that the word
'claim' was used in its broadest connotation and
we recognize that it is susceptible of a variety of
meanings; ranging from a moral claim; or the
seeking of legislative largesse; or asserting a privilege; to asserting right to compensation for property or materials furnished, or salary for services
rendered, to the state."
To the extent that the foregoing definition purports
to define those claims which may be examined by the Board
of Examiners prior to submission to the Legislature, it is
submitted that the definition is a good one. This is so because any person who has any claim of any kind under any
theory is free to present the same to the Board of Examiners for its action, and further, to petition the Legislature
by way of special legislation. But, the foregoing definition
cannot have complete application to the claims which are
paid from appropriated funds. Even this is clear from the
fact that the above definition refers to legislative largesse,
which certainly could not be granted by anyone except the
Legislature itself.
Further, it is important to note that the legislation in
question in no way purports to restrict or prevent the
Board of Examiners from examining any claim or assertion whereby any person aggrieved believes that he has a
claim against appropriated funds. The only effect of the
language in Section 63-2-20 is that, with reference to those
claims which are processed pursuant to the administrative
procedures set forth in that section, the examination shall
be made after the obligation is created and before payment is made. Nothing is said to suggest that the Board
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of Examiners in any way is restricted from examining
claims which have not been processed pursuant to the
procedures of said section.
The vital criterion applicable here as to the meaning
of the word "claim" is whether or not the person asserting
it does so as a claim of right. Anything short of this should
not be considered to be a claim with respect to payments
from appropriated funds. Illustrative of the numerous
authorities which have digested the cases and uniformly
recited the rule are the following:
Winfield, Adjudged Words & Phrases, page 110:
"[A claim] is, in a just jurdicial sense, a demand of some matter as of right made by one person upon another, to do or to forbear to do some
act or thing as a matter of duty."
Black's Law Dictionary (1891 Ed.), page 209:
"A claim is a right or title, actual or supposed,
to a debt, privilege, or other thing in the possession
of another; not the possession, but the means by or
through which the claimant obtains the possession
or enjoyment."
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (2nd Ed.), Vol. 1, page
317:
" 'Claime', is a challenge by any man of the
propertie or ownership of a thing which hee hath
not in possession, but is withholden from him
wrongfully."
Wharton's Law Lexicon (12th Ed.), page 177:
"[A claim is] a challenge of interest of anything which is in another's possession, or at least
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out of a man's own possession, as claim by charter,
descent, etc."
Repalje and Lawrence's Law Dictionary, Vol. 1, page
215:
" [A claim is] a challenge by any man of the
property or ownership of a thing, not at the time
in his possession, but (as he contends) wrongfully
withheld from him."

Kinney's Law Dictionary and Glossary, page 157:
" [A claim is] a challenge or demand of the
property or ownership or of some interest in a
thing which the person demanding has not in his
possession, but which is withheld from him unlawfully; a demand of some matter as of right made by
one person upon another, to do or to forbear to do
some act or thing as a matter of duty."

Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's Revision), Vol. 1,
page 332:
"[A claim is] a challenge of the ownership of
a thing which is wrongfully withheld from the possession of the claimant * * *. The assertion
of a liability to the party making it to do some service or pay a sum of money."
Words and Phrases (Permanent Ed.), Vol. 7, pages
457-58:
"In its ordinary sense, a 'claim' imparts the
assertion, demand, or challenge, of somehting as
a right, or it means the thing thus demanded or
challenged.

"* * *
" 'Claim', in its primary meaning, is used to
indicate the assertion of an existing right. In its
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secondary meaning it may be used to indicate the
right itself."
Ballantine, Law Dictionary (2nd Ed.), page 220:
" [A claim is] the assertion of a demand, or the
challenge of something, as a matter or right; a
demand of some matter, as of right, made by one
person upon another to do or to forbear to do some
act or thing, as a matter of duty."
Anderson's Dictionary of Law, page 185:
" [A claim is] the assertion, demand or challenge of something as a right, or the thing thus
demanded or challenged."
From the forgoing authorities, it is clear that no other
meaning or connotation of the word "claim" could have
been intended by the framers of the Constitution other
than an assertion of something as a matter of right, at
least with respect to those requests for payment from appropriated funds. And further still, the language of 63.:.
2-20, referring to the Board's examination of claims, relates only to those claims processed in accordance with
such section and in no way purports to restrict the Board
in its examination of other claims. It is, therefore, submitted that Section 63-2-20 should be sustained.
POINT IV.
THE SALARY PAYMENT TO CLAIR R. HOPKINS WAS LAWFUL.
A.

To hold that the Board of Examiners has a
constitutional duty rather than a constitu-
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tional power demeans rather than dignifies
the Board.
The real question of power versus duty has been
clouded to the extent that it has caused considerable confusion. It has been assumed and believed (in the press and
elsewhere) that this litigation involves the question of
broad powers within the Board of Examiners versus restricted powers within the Board of Examiners. Nothing
could be further from the truth. The position of the defendants is that the Board of Examiners has a very broad
power to examine any and all claims against the State of
Utah, but that it is not absolutely necessary for the Board
to examine all of such claims if in its discretion it decides
that it is unwise, unnecessary or impractical to examine
certain claims. In other words, defendants contend that
the Board of Examiners as a responsible constitutional entity is equipped with the necessary discretion and responsibility to decide when and under what circumstances any
certain claim or group of claims should be examined. If it
decides to examine all claims, it may do so. If it decides
that there are certain routine claims which do not justify
an examination, it has the constitutional discretion to decide not to examine such claims. But, this discretion as to
whether to examine or not to examine lies solely within
the Board itself, and not in any other agency or officer.
It is submitted that this position is fundamentally sound,
for to hold that the Board of Examiners must examine all
claims whether it wants to or not, is to hold that the Board
of Examiners has sufficient discretion to examine and ap-
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prove or reject claims, but does not have reliable discretion to determine which claims should be examined. Such
a result, to say the least, is both anomalous and paradoxical.
Plaintiff contends and the lower court held that the
Board of Examiners has a constitutional duty to examine
every claim of every nature, regardless of how routine, insignificant, or mechanical the claim might be. Plaintiff,
therefore, concludes that the failure of the Board of Examiners to examine any claim, including any semi-monthly
salary payment of any State employee, is a failure to perform a constitutional requisite and, therefore, causes any
payment of such claim to be absolutely void. Plaintiff
would thus say that, if the Board of Examiners failed to
examine and approve the validity of a $5.00 purchase of
supplies, the payment for such supplies would be unlawful
and void.
It must at once become obvious that plaintiff's position would not dignify the Board nor increase its power,
but would, rather, reduce the Board of Examiners to a
rather menial and perfunctory body which would have to
examine many thousands of claims each month even though
the Board itself saw no reason to examine many of the
claims and did not want to examine many of the claims.
When one considers the thousands of warrants that are
issued semi-monthly by the Department of Finance for
the payment of salaries, and the thousands of other warrants that are drawn to pay travel expenses, contract expenses, acquisition of supplies, etc., it is absurd to believe
that the Board of Examiners could perform such a task
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even if it devoted itself to a full time attempt to examine
such claims.
It must be assumed that the Governor, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of State each have full-time demands upon them in their respective offices, aside from
the requirements of service upon the Board of Examiners.
To hold that these busy chief officials of the State of Utah
must take the time to examine and act upon all claims, and
thus, in effect, do what it takes literally dozens of employees in the Department of Finance to do, is to depart from
reason, logic and practicality, and to impose a completely
illogical, unreasonable, and impossible burden upon the
Board of Examiners.

It therefore is obvious that in order to sustain the
greatest dignity, independence, and power in the Board of
Examiners as a responsible constitutional entity, it is necessary to conclude that the Board has both discretion and
power to examine all claims it wishes to examine, but that
it does not have the menial and mechanical duty of examining those claims which in its discretion do not justify
nor deserve examination.
Plaintiff's position and the lower court's holding in
this lawsuit is in fact one which demeans rather than
dignifies the Board of Examiners.
B.

The legislation under review is not affected
by a determination of the question of constitutional power versus constitutional duty.

It is important to clarify the issue of a constitution-
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ality duty versus a constitutional power with respect to the
legislation in question. Neither Section 63-2-13, Section 632-15, nor Section 63-2-20 is affected by a determination of
this question, since it must be recognized that if the Legislature has a constitutional duty, it cannot be interfered with
by the Legislature, and if the Board of Examiners has a
constitutional power, it cannot be interfered with by the
Legislature. Therefore, the legislation cannot in any way
preclude the Board of Examiners from examining any or all
claims against the State of Utah. If the legislation purports to do so, it must be unconstitutional, whether this
Court finds that the Board has a constitutional duty or a
constitutional power. The only affect of this court's determination of the question of duty versus power is with
regard to the validity of the salary payment of defendant
Clair R. Hopkins. This is so because the Board of Examiners as a board did not elect to examine or to approve the
salary payment in question. If there was a constitutional
power to examine or not to examine in the discretion of
the Board, then the salary payment was lawful. If, on the
other hand, there was a constitutional duty to examine this
salary payment in question, then, since that duty was not
exercised, the salary payment would be unlawful because of
a failure to satisfy a mandatory condition precedent to
payment.
Therefore, it is emphasized that the resolution of the
question of power versus duty does not affect the legislation. If the legislation restricts or prevents the Board of
Examiners from examining claims, it must be unconstitu-
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tional whether it interferes with a power or a duty. The
only importance of the determination of this question relates solely to the salary claim of Clair R. Hopkins and not
to the validity of the legislation.
C.

The Constitution specifically and clearly
grants a power rather than imposes a duty.

It is submitted that the Utah Supreme Court has never
distinguished power versus duty when speaking about the
Board of Examiners. When deciding other issues, the
Court has on occasion used language by way of dicta which
would suggest that the Board had a duty. But, as will be
shown in a later discussion of those cases, little significance
can be attached to such language because the court was
not focusing upon the distinction between a power and a

duty.

Of critical significance is the language of Article VII,
Section 13, of the Constitution of Utah, which provides :

"* * * They shall, also, constitute a Board
of Examiners, with power to examine all claims
against the State except salaries or compensation
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other
duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim
against the State, except for salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed
upon by the Legislature without having been considered and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners." (Emphasis added.)
The above language is clear to the effect that the
Board has power to examine all claims against the State
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law.
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As to those claims which must be acted upon by the Legislature, the Board must as a constitutional prerequisite act
upon such claims prior to their consideration by the Legislature. It is significant to note that there is no similar
prerequisite for the payment of claims which are not presented to the Legislature.
In other words, claims such as tort claims for which
the State is not liable because of its soverign immunity,
and other claims for which no legal redress is available
to the claimant except by petition to the Legislature, require examination by the Board of Examiners. But claims
for which appropriations have been made and which can
be paid through ordinary State fiscal procedures without
submission to the Legislature do not require examination
by the Board of Examiners as a constitutional prerequisite,
although the Board has power to examine such claims if it
wishes to do so.
Two factors of importance appear from the language
of the constitutional provision. First, the Constitution uses
the clear, unmnbiguous, meaningful word "power", and
neither uses nor suggests the word "duty" when referring
to an examination of claims. The second factor is that the
Constitution does establish a required examination by the
Board of those claims which are submitted to the Legislature. The negative implication must be that claims not required to be submitted to the Legislature need not be examined unless the Board elects to examine them. Therefore, the use of the word "power", coupled with the negative implication that no examination is mandatory for pay-
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ments of claims from appropriated funds, establishes with
clarity that the Board has simply a power and not a duty.
As earlier stated, no case decided by this Court has
ever held that the Board of Examiners has a constitutional
duty to examine claims which are to be paid from appropriated funds. This is so because the specific question
has never been presented to the Court. When discussing
other issues, the Court has used language which might be
considered dicta and which might suggest that the Board
did have such a duty. But, it will appear from an examination of those cases that such language not only was not
the holding of the Court, but was not even dicta, for the
reason that the Court was not considering the specific
question. In other words, true dictum is a clear statement
by the Court on an issue which it was not necessary for
the Court to decide. But, a statement by the Court which
is not even in response to a consideration of a specific
question can hardly be said to be dicta with respect to such
a question. This will be illustrated in the cases of State
v. Edwards, Uintdh State Bank v. Ajax, and Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, discussed in that order
below.
In State v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908),
a certain statute provided for the employment of court
stenographers and for the payment of certain travel expenses by a procedure whereby the District Judge would
certify the travel expense vouchers to the State Auditor,
who in turn was required to draw a warrant in payment
of such travel expense. The question was not whether the
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Board of Examiners had a duty to examine such claims
for expense reimbursement, but was whether the Legisla~
ture could provide for a procedure of payment which would
bypass the Board of Examiners and thereafter prevent the
Board of Examiners from conducting an examination even
if it wished to. Despite this clear-cut issue, the Court was
rather loose in the language which it employed, and such
language might mistakenly be construed to suggest that
the court thought an examination by the Board of Exam~
iners was a constitutional prerequisite to payment:
"The attempt by the Legislature to require the
Auditor to allow a claim which by the Constitution
must first be approved by the board of examiners
can avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the
constitutional provision. The Legislature is so
bound, and so are we. The Legislature may make
certain evidence conclusive with regard to a specific
matter, but it may not interfere with powers conferred or duties imposed by the Constitution. This,
in effect, is what is attempted to be done in section
2, c. 72, p. 112, aforesaid. To the extent that the
provisions of that section are in conflict with the
constitutional provision governing salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, the Constitution
must prevail." (Emphasis added.)
It must be borne in mind, in reading the foregoing
quote, that the issue was whether the Legislature could
exclude the Board of Examiners from examining travel
reimbursement claims. The issue was not whether the
Board of Examiners was required to examine such claims
if in its discretion it considered such an examination unnecessary.
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The second case using confusing language is Uintah
State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434 (1931),
which involved a n1andamus proceeding to compel the State
Auditor to draw a warrant in payment of bounty claims
for killing predatory animals (25 coyotes and 7 bobcats).
The bank apparently had taken an assignment of the bounty
claim as security for a loan and then found it necessary to
seek payment of the bounty claim in satisfaction of the
debt. In any event, the bank demanded payment from the
State Auditor and the Auditor declined on the ground that
the statute providing for bounty payments purported to
bypass the Board of Examiners. The issue in this case
was identical to the issue in the Edwards case, i.e., whether
the Legislature could bypass the Board of Examiners so
as to exclude the Board from any examination of bounty
claims. The Court said that the Edwards decision was controlling and proceeded to hold that the Legislature could
not bypass the Board of Examiners :

"* * * May the Legislature then, in the
face of our constitutional provision, pass over the
board of examiners and set up some local agency
by which claims may be fixed and settled without
any state officer having power to examine and approve or disapprove such claim?

"* * * The Constitution has vested in the
Board of Examiners the power to examine and pass
on all claims except those exempted, and the Legislature is without authority to delegate such power
to any other board or officer.
"* * * If the view is taken that the Legislature intended to make this claim payable by the
auditor without presentation to the board of examiners, then the Legislature attempted to do that
which it had no power or authority to effectuate
* *

*"
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It will be observed that the language used by the Court
in the Uintah State Bank case suggests in some respects
that an examination by the Board of Examiners is a prerequisite to payment of bounty claims. Such a conclusion
would mean that the Board has a constitutional duty to
examine claims. However, the Court also employed language
which suggested that the Board had merely a power and
that such power could not be taken from the Board of Examiners and given to some other agency or officer. The
reason for this loose and apparently conflicting language
is simple-the Court was considering and deciding whether
the Legislature could bypass the Board of Examiners and
prevent the Board from examining bounty claims, and the
Court held that the Legislature could not enact such a
statute. But, that was all that the Court did decide, since
there was no consideration of the question as to whether
the Board of Examiners was required as a constitutional
prerequisite to examine each and every bounty claim.

The third case which used language suggesting that
the Board of Examiners might have a duty to examine
claims related to a salary claim. That case was Board of
Education v. Cornrnission of Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247
P. 2d 435 (1952), wherein the Board of Education instituted an original proceeding in the Supreme Court to compel the Commission of Finance to issue warrants on the
State Treasurer for payment of salary claims of Dr. E.
Allen Bateman. The issue in the case did not relate in any
way to the power or duty of the Board of Examiners to
approve salary claims, since the Board of Examiners had

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
already approved the salary claim in question. However,
in making a passing comment with reference to the salary
claim, the Court noted that it had been approved by the
Board of Examiners, and said parenthetically, that the
Board "must approve all salary claims against the State" :
"The Board of Examiners (composed of the
Governor, Secretary of State and the Attorney General) tvhich must approve all salary claims against
the State, except those fixed by law, approved by a
vote of two to one the request of the Board of Education to pay Dr. Bateman a salary of $10,000.00
per annum." (Emphasis added.)
It again is emphasized that no issue is present with
respect to whether the Board had a power or a duty to
examine salary claims, and in fact the Board had approved
the salary claim in question. Therefore, the particular
language used by the Court could not be deemed to have
any particular significance with respect to the particular
issue of a constitutional power versus a constitutional duty.

Aside from the three cases just mentioned (which
vaguely suggest a constitutional duty), there is a fourth
case, which is the clearest pronouncement available. That
case, Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners, 21 Utah 187,
60 Pac. 982 (1900), involved a claim for refund of lease
rentals which had been paid pursuant to a void lease. Certain school lands had been leased by the claimant pursuant
to a statute which later was declared unconstitutional. The
Legislature then enacted a statute which provided for refund of all rentals collected under the void leases, and
specifically directed the Board of Examiners "to receive,
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audit, and allow all just claims of persons who have paid
moneys in pursuance of (the void leases)."
In the original appeal, the Court held that the Board
could do no more than perform the ministerial act of auditing and allowing all claims which met the legislative criteria for payment. The Board then petitioned for rehearing, and on rehearing the Court discussed the constitutional
and statutory duty of the Board in examining claims for
lease refunds :
The board of examiners are required to perform the
duties mentioned in said section of the constitution,
and also to perform such other duties as may be
prescribed by law. Therefore, the only duties in the
premises imposed upon the board of examiners are
such as section 963 of the Revised Statutes prescribes." (Emphasis added.)
The Court thus clearly stated that, under the constitutional provision and the applicable statute, the only duties
of the Board were under the statute. Nothing could be
clearer than the conclusion that there could thus be no
constitutional duty. But, in fairness, it is admitted that,
here again, the Court was not considering the power to
examine versus the duty to examine, and an objective analysis of the cases cannot lend more weight to Thoreson
than to the other cases.
The four cases discussed above are the only ones
using any language of particular significance that even
discussed whether the Board of Examiners has a constitutional duty to examine claims to be paid from appropriated
funds. Such language is not only unclear, but it was not
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even used in response to the particular issue under discussion. Therefore, it could not be said that such language
could have the effect of establishing a stare decisis precedent for construing the word "power" to mean duty rather
than power. Therefore, it appears clear that there is no
judicial precedent to justify construing the clear phraseology of Article VII, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution,
to mean anything more, less or different from what it says.
POINT V.
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS CANNOT DELEGATE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DISCRETION.
It is believed that the lower court's determination with
respect to delegation of constitutional authority is correct.
In essence, the lower court held that the Board of Examiners could not delegate any of its constitutional discretion
but could establish certain criteria for guidelines and permit some subordinate officer or agency to examine certain
claims to determine whether the criteria were met. If so,
the Board of Examiners would then accept such determination and then exercise its discretion in approving the
claims. If the criteria were not met, then the Board could
use its discretion in determining the validity of the claim.
The reason the question of delegation is raised in this
brief is because this Court has not yet spoken concerning
the extent to which the Board of Examiners can delegate
such discretionary authority. Since plaintiff did not appeal, it is deemed advisable to raise this issue in this appeal so that it will be /Proper for the Court to comment
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upon the extent to which such a delegation is proper. This
issue would become critically important if this Court were
to hold that the Board of Examiners had a constitutional
duty to examine every claim of every nature, because the
Board simply is not equipped to do that type of job without a great deal of assistance. If the Board of Examiners
were to attempt to delegate any routine matters to the Department of Finance, serious questions would arise as to
the propriety of such a delegation because the Legislature
created the Department of Finance to function directly under the office of the Governor and not under the Board
of Examiners. Therefore, no funds were appropriated for
the Department of Finance to function as an agent of the
Board of Examiners. Further, even if it should be considered proper for the Department of Finance to so function, it would appear that the Department could not be compelled to accept such an assignment except by specific legislation assigning such a task to it. Of course, no such legislation presently exists.
If the Board of Examiners is found to have a constitutional duty and if the Department of Finance cannot
function as the agent of the Board of Examiners, then the
Board of Examiners would have to find funds to employ
a great many assistants to process all claims prior to their
payment. Such a result would seem to be an illogical and
unnecessary duplication of the services now performed by
the Department of Finance under the direction of the Governor.
As observed above, it is believed that the lower court
did not commit error in the general decision which it made
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concerning delegation of constitutional authority, but a
good many practical problems are created by the lower
court's further holding that the Board of Examiners had
a constitutional duty to examine all claims. Therefore, if
this Court should hold that the Board has a constitutional
duty, then it should consider and perhaps speak upon the
nature and extent to which such a duty can be exercised
by delegation.
POINT VI.
IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE BOARD
OF EXAMINERS MUST APPROVE ALL
CLAIMS, THEN THE BOARD MAY APPROVE
ROUTINE CLAIMS BY A MAJORITY THEREOF INDIVIDUALLY SIGNING THEIR NAMES
IN APPROVAL WITHOUT MEETING IN A
CONVENED SESSION OF THE BOARD.
Appellants emphasize that this point is important only
if the Court holds that the Board has a constitutional duty
to approve all claims (other than salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law). If the Court holds, as appellants contend, that the Board has only a constitutional
power, to be exercised in the discretion of the Board, then
this point becomes moot, because the Board then can consider only those claims which it wishes to examine, and
can conduct any such examination in a meeting of the
Board.
The lower court held that any constitutional authority
exercised by the Board of Examiners would have to be
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exercised in either a regular or special meeting of the
Board. The practice followed for some time by the Board
has been for the members to sign their names to a "summary" sheet which is attached to payroll claims, expense
reimbursement claims, contract payment claims, etc. This
perfunctory approval has been performed in the respective
offices of the members, and there has been no meeting
where the members have met together for the purpose of
approving these claims. Of course, many claims which
the Board thought worthy of its attention have been considered in meetings of the Board, but the general procedure for approving routine items has been as stipulated by
counsel in the Statement of Facts.
This means, then, that, under the lower court's ruling,
the Board will be compelled to meet in session for the
purpose of approving all claims. We do not necessarily
contend that a constitutional function of the Board of Examiners can be discharged by members of the Board acting
individually. We submit that all claims which the Board
desires to examine should be examined by it in either a
regular or special meeting.
But, if this Court were to hold that the Board had a
constitutional duty to examine all claims (as did the lower
court), then this would require the Board to meet with impractical frequency. This Court will take judicial notice
of all official acts of executive departments of the State
of Utah (Section 78-25-1 (3), Utah Code Ann.). There-fore, this Court will judicially notice that the Department
of Finance issues payroll warrants to State employees on
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the 5th, 1Oth, 20th and 25th of each month, and that, in
addition thereto, there is an average of at least two warrant .,runs" each week to pay other claims. There is an
average of from 12 to 15 separate IBM "runs" of warrants
every month, and the Board of Examiners would thus have
to meet in session at least this often to examine and approve these claims prior to issuing the warrants thereon.
Meeting in this manner not less than three times a week
is very impractical.
The practice of the Board of Examiners over the years
has demonstrated the futility of meeting to examine and
approve all claims. The Board members have individually
signed approval to cover sheets or summary sheets so that
all routine expenditures could be made. This was done, not
because the Board made any actual examination of the
claims, but because the Board wasn't sure whether it was
required to approve such claims or not, and the simplest
means was individual signatures of approval without meeting in session. Matters which the Board considered of
sufficient importance for its attention were discussed in
actual meetings of the Board.
If the Court holds that the Board has a constitutional

power to examine claims, then the Board can examine those
claims which it wishes to examine in the meetings of the
Board. If this Court holds that the Board must examine
all claims (even against its wishes), and further holds that
the examination must be conducted by the Board in a meeting, then the Board would be required to meet with impractical and annoying frequency to discharge a task which
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would be considered by the Board to be an unnecessary,
burdensome nuisance.
CONCLUSION
Three significant questions of law have been presented in this appeal, none of which has heretofore been
determined by this Court. All three of the questions relate to the meaning of Article VII, Section 13, of the Utah
Constitution. The first question is whether the Board of
Examiners has constitutional authority to fix salary figures or to arbitrarily prevent payment of salary claims.
The second question is whether the word "claims" means
only those demands pursuant to an asserted right, or
whether it means something broader, including applications
for employment, uncompetitive bids, and similar matters
wherein no right or claim of right is present. The third
question is whether the Board has simply a constitutional
power to examine claims, or whether it has the more onerous burden of a constitutional duty to examine claims.
Based upon the arguments presented in this brief, we
conclude as follows:
A. Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of Utah, uses
the clear, meaningful and unambiguous words "power" and
"claim". Nothing is said about a "duty" to examine claims,
and nothing is said about "claims" meaning and including
something more than claims. Nor is there the slightest hint
that the Board has any authority to fix or set salaries.
B. The most efficient and practical administration
of state fiscal matters will be realized by giving the con-
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stitutional provision a literal interpretation and thus sustaining the legislation in question. Further, such a result
will not deny the Board of Examiners full power to examine
claims, but in fact will give it greater dignity and discretion. It should be noted that the Legislature considered the
constitutional power of the Board of Examiners when the
finance law was passed (by specifically mentioning the
Board's power to examine claims), and that Senate Bill
48 had bi-partisan support in that it was sponsored by
Senator Thorpe Waddingham (Democrat) and Senator
Hughes Brockbank (Republican). Senate Bill 48 further
had the approval of the Governor, as attested to by his
signing the bill into law and further by his position in this
litigation. Senate Bill 48, as now enacted into law, also has
the support of the Department of Finance and a majority
of the Board of Examiners (evidenced by their positions
in this litigation).
C. Since the Legislature, the Governor, the Department of Finance and a majority of the Board of Examiners
have demonstrated their support of Senate Bill 48 as
enacted into law (and which was the product of 22 years
experience with the previous Commission of Finance), this
Court should not construe the clear and unambiguous word
~~power" to mean something completely different, nor
should it construe the clear and unambiguous word "claims"
to mean something more than claims, nor should it judicially create authority to fix salaries when no such authority is suggested; particularly when to do so would produce
an illogical and unworkable end result.
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D. In other words, this Court should not hold that
the constitutional phrase "with power to examine all
claims" means a duty to examine all applications, requests
and petitions, and the authority to fix salaries, as did the
lower court. The Board's constitutional power to examine
claims which are to be paid from appropriated funds was
intended as a protection to public funds, not as a device to
require administrative processing, fixing and adjudicating
of all conceivable requests, applications and petitions.
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should be
reversed, and Sections 63-2-13, 63-2-15 and 63-2-20 should
be sustained as constitutional, and the salary payment to
Clair R. Hopkins should be declared lawful.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP,
Assistant Attorney General,
ROLAND G. ROBISON, JR.,
Special Assistant
Attorney General,

Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants.
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APPENDIX
This Court has on ten separate occasions spoken concerning the constitutional authority of the Board of Examiners. These cases are discussed chronologically and in
some detail in the following appendix. The appendix is
attached as a somewhat objective analysis of the cases pertaining to the Board of Examiners and its constitutional
authority. A detailed discussion of all of those cases within
the body of this brief would have made the brief too long
and too involved. But, the issues in this case have sufficient importance to justify a careful examination by the
Court of all previous cases to review the complete body of
case law relating to the Board as a constitutional entity.
It is hoped that the appendix will be a convenience to the
Court.
The Board of Examiners is created by Article VII,
Section 13, Constitution of Utah, which provides:
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General shall
constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners,
which Board shall have such supervision of all matters connected with the State Prison as may be provided by law. They shall, also, constitute a Board
of Examiners, with power to examine all claims
against the State except salaries or compensation
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other
duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim
against the State, except for salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed
upon by the Legislature without having been considered and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners."
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An examination of the constitutional power of the
Board is largely confined to an examination of Article VII,
Section 13 of the Utah Constitution, as it has been judicially construed. In Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18, 57 Pac. 175 ( 1899), the Utah Supreme
Court was confronted with the question as to whether the
Board of Examiners had discretionary authority to reject
a claim for refund of moneys paid pursuant to a void lease,
when the Legislature had provided for such refund. The
claimant had leased from the state certain school lands
pursuant to an early statute authorizing such leases, and
had paid lease rentals in accordance therewith. The statute authorizing such leases was later declared unconstitutional and the Legislature thereupon passed an act providing for repayment of lease rentals collected under the void
leases. The Board of Examiners rejected a part of Thoreson's claim on the ground that the money paid did not reach
the territorial treasury. The statute directed the Board
"to receive, audit, and allow all just claims of persons who
have paid moneys in pursuance of (the void leases)." In
holding that the function of the Board in this instance was
ministerial and not discretionary, the court said:
"It is contended by appellant's counsel 'that
the board cannot audit and allow just claims presented to it without first sitting in judgment upon
such claims, and hearing the necessary evidence,
and making a proper investigation to determine
whether claims come within this class.' This states
the matter too broadly. The only investigation
which the board is authorized to make is whether
the money claimed was paid in pursuance of the act
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of 1892. The board had no authority to reject a
portion of the respondent's claim on the ground
that none of the money paid, except the amount of
the claim audited and allowed, ever reached the
territorial treasury; for no such condition as that
is contained in section 963 of the Revised Statutes.
Its terms are plain, explicit, and unambiguous. They
are susceptible of but one interpretation, and that
is: The board shall receive, audit, and allow all
moneys paid in pursuance of the act of 1892. The
payments under that act were to be made to the
county courts, and not to the territorial treasurer.
The facts admitted by the appellant and found by
the court show that the money claimed was paid by
the relator's assignor in pursuance of the act of
1892. The money so paid was, as has already been
shown, the money which the legislature intended
should be refunded, and therefore any claim for
money so paid is a just claim."
The primary reason the Board refused payment of the disputed part of Thoreson's claim was because Article X, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provided "All public School
Funds shall be guaranteed by the State against loss or diversion," and that to pay money as reimbursement for
school land lease rentals, when such funds never reached
the territorial treasury, would violate such constitutional
provision. The court rejected this contention, not deciding
whether in fact the Constitution would be violated, but
saying simply that the Board had no authority to decide
judicial questions and that the court couldn't decide the
question in a mandamus proceeding:
"The decision of such a question by the board
was the exercise of a judicial function. No such
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judicial power was conferred upon it. Its discretion and duty in the premises were confined to the
ascertainment of what, if any, amount the relator's
assignor had paid in pursuance of the act of 1892.
* * * To allow mere ministerial officers, who
have no direct personal interest in the matter, to
refuse to perform an act clearly pointed out, and
made their official duty, by a statute, on the ground
that the performance of the act would violate the
constitution, would be establishing a very dangerous precedent, and one not warranted by the authorities."
It is important to note that in the Thoreson case the

court seemed to focus only upon the statute requiring repayment of the lease rentals, and refused to recognize more
than an auditing function in the Board because the statute
conferred nothing more than an auditing function. The
first opinion in Thoreson certainly is not very persuasive
authority as to the discretionary or quasi-judicial powers
given to the Board by the Constitution.
On rehearing in the Thoreson case, 21 Utah 187, 60
Pac. 982 ( 1900) , it was contended by the Board that the
statute directing repayment of the lease moneys was unconstitutional to the extent that it reduced the Board to a
mere auditor of claims contrary to the constitutional power
the Board had to examine claims. In affirming its original
decision, and after quoting the constitutional provision creating the Board, the court said :
"The board of examiners are required to perform the duties mentioned in said section of the
constitution, and also to perform such other duties
as may be prescribed by law. Therefore the only
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duties in the premises imposed upon the board of
examiners are such as section 963 of the Revised
Statutes prescribes. In our former opinion we held
that the only discretionary power which the board
of examiners had in the matter was to ascertain
whether or not respondent's assignor had paid on
a lease made in pursuance of the void act of the territorial legislature the sum claimed by the respondent, and it having been admitted that said sum
had been so paid, that such payment was, therefore,
a just claim within the meaning of said section of
the statute, and that said board of examiners had
no right to reject said claim on the ground that
section 963 of the Revised Statutes was violative
of the constitution, but that it became and was the
mandatory duty of the said board to receive, audit,
and allow said claim, and that mandamus lies to enforce the performance of that ministerial duty. We
did not hold, as intimidated in appellant's brief,
that the board of examiners is a mere perfunctory
body, not capable of exercising any judgment or
discretion in matters of allowing or rejecting claims
against the state, but held that in the particulars
mentioned in this case, where the claim is admitted
to be just, the board had no discretion, but their
duties were mandatory. Upon a careful review of
the case, we are satisfied that our former conclusions are correct." (Emphasis added.)
Justice Miner, concurring, seemed to suggest that the Board
of Examiners was to act under the Constitution only "until
otherwise provided by law," at which time the Board
would act pursuant to statute only, the provision of the
Constitution then being fully supplanted by legislation as
was intended by the Constitution :
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"By the constitution the board were to examine
all claims against the state until otherwise provided
by law, and were also to perform such other duties
as might be provided by law. Section 963 was a
provision authorizing and directing the board to
examine and allow all just claims arising under a
former statute. * * * Until otherwise provided
by law, the board were to act under the constitution. Until otherwise provided by law, no claim
against the state, except salaries, etc., could be
passed upon by the legislature, without having been
considered and acted upon by the board; but the
board were to perform such other duties as might
be provided by law, and section 963 was enacted
in pursuance of the provision in the constitution.
I am unable to see any good reason why the claim
should not have been audited and allowed." (Emphasis added.)
As shall be seen later, Justice Miner's reasoning was rejected in subsequent cases decided by the court.
In Marioneau v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 Pac. 355
(1907), the petitioner, a district judge, applied for a writ
of mandate against the Board of Examiners to compel payment for mileage as a travel expense. The statute fixing
compensation of district judges at $4,000.00 per year provided that no mileage or expenses should be allowed in addition to the salary. Initially, Article VIII, Section 20 of
the Utah Constitution fixed the salary of district judges
at $3,000.00 per year until otherwise provided by law. Subsequent legislation allowed mileage reimbursement in addition to the $3,000.00 salary. Finally, the act in question
raised the annu~l salary to $4,000.00 but expressly disallowed the mileage.
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The Board rejected the claim for mileage because it
was contrary to the statute. The plaintiff District Judge
contended ( 1) that the provision denying mileage expense
was void because it constituted a double subject matter in
one statute, thereby violating the single subject requirement of the Constitution; (2) that the mileage limitation
was not the proper subject of a proviso; (3) that the subject of the act was not clearly expressed in the title because no reference was made in the title to the elimination
of the mileage expense; and ( 4) the earlier statute allowing mileage was still in effect because no express provision
was enacted to repeal it. The petitioner alleged, inter alia,
that the Board refused to audit and allow the mileage claim,
"upon the sole ground that respondents (Board members)
were advised and believed that there was no law of this
state authorizing the allowance thereof, and therefore rejected the same."
In rejecting the contentions of the petitioner, and in
dismissing the petition for writ of mandate, the court apparently sustained the quasi-judicial determination of the
Board that the claim was not permitted by law. In so doing, the court examined and decided the legal questions to
determine whether the action of the Board was sound as
to the principles of law involved.

Marioneaux may not be entirely consistent with the
first Thoreson case, supra, wherein the court held the
Board of Examiners was without authority to decide the
judicial question as to whether refund of lease rental payments was an unconstitutional "loss or diversion" of pub-
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lie school funds. In that case the court simply said 11 the
decision of such a question by the board was the exercise
of a judicial function. No such judicial power was conferred upon it." The court then refused to decide the question for itself, stating such would be improper in a mandamus proceeding.
In State V. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720 (1908),
the court was called upon to decide whether reimbursement
for travel expense of a court stenographer was "salary or
compensation of officers fixed by law," and therefore beyond the province of the Board to examine. A statute permitted district judges to employ court stenographers and
to provide for certain travel expenses, not exceeding certain maximum limitations. The statute further provided
that upon a certification by the judge as to the amount to
be paid the State Auditor would draw a warrant for payment of the same. The court held that the employment of,
and reimbursement of travel expenses for, court stenographers was compensation fixed by contract between the district judge and the stenographer, and that, even though
such was authorized by law, it was not compensation fixed
by law. The court said that the Legislature had no authority to bypass the Board of Examiners by directing the State
Auditor to make payment directly upon receiving a certification by the District Judge :
"The authority conferred by the state upon certain officials to enter into contracts with other persons, and to agree upon the compensation to be
paid for public services contemplated by the contract, not exceeding a specified sum, as we view
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it, falls far short of fixing such compensation by
law as contemplated by the Constitution."

"*

*

*

"The attempt by the Legislature to require the
Auditor to allow a claim which by the Constitution
must first be approved by the board of examiners
can avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the con-

stitutional provision. The Legislature is so bound,
and so are we. The Legislature may make certain
evidence conclusive with regard to a specific matter, but it may not interfere with powers conferred
or duties imposed by the Constitution. This, in
effect, is what is attempted to be done in section
2, c. 72, p. 112, aforesaid. To the extent that the
provisions of that section are in conflict with the
constitutional provision governing salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, the Constitution
must prevail." (Emphasis added.)
Thereafter, the stenographer's claim was presented to the
Board of Examiners, but was denied, inter alia, because
the Board thought the certification insufficient in that the
mileage reimbursement was based upon a fixed rate per
mile, and the Board thought the reimbursement should be
limited to the amount actually spent by the stenographer.
In any event, the court issued its mandate requiring the
Board to audit and pay the claim for mileage, holding that
the rate per mile was authorized by the Legislature and
that in such instances the Board had practically no discretionary power other than to ascertain that the legislative
requirements are met:
"It is further urged that a writ of mandate
should not issue against respondents for the reason
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that in passing upon claims against the state they
act in a quasi judicial capacity and must therefore
be permitted to exercise the discretion usually exercised by such boards. That respondents do act in
such a capacity, and that they may exercise discretionary powers in the discharge of their official duties in passing upon and in allowing or rejecting
claims, does not admit of doubt. But this discretion is not one that may be arbitrarily exercised so
as to prevent a claimant from seeking redress in
the courts where purely questions of law are involved. In such cases even courts may be compelled
to proceed to judgment, and, where the law directs
what the judgment shall be in case all the facts are
found or admitted, a superior court may direct an
inferior one with respect to the particular judgment that shall be entered by it. The power to do
this is not limited to appellate proceedings, as is
illustrated in the case of State v. Morse, 31 Utah
213, 87 Pac. 705. In this case the essential facts
entitling the relator to have his claim audited and
allowed are all admitted. The questions, therefore,
are purely questions of law. If the claim, therefore, is one which is admitted to be just, and is
authorized by law, and there is no dispute with
regard to any fact involved, and the claim is presented to the board in due form as the law requires,
we know of no law nor reason why respondents,
although acting in a quasi judicial capacity, should
not be required to audit and allow the claim. (Emphasis added.)

'* * *
"In view of the conceded facts, there is nothing
upon which the respondents can legally exercise any
discretionary powers in this case, and therefore
they should have audited and allowed the claim.
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No doubt they would have done so had they not
entertained a view of the law different from the
one we feel constrained to take. In such a case it
is clear that the law in effect directs what the action of the board shall be, and, this being so, there
is no reason why the board of examiners should
not be required to comply with what it commands.
There would be something lacking in our system
of government or jurisprudence if under such circumstances a claimant could be defeated simply because the officer or board required to audit and
allow his claim exercised some discretion in the matter. Where the duty to act is clear, and the law
gives a right to obtain payment of a claim owing
by the state, courts should not hesitate to enforce
the right by mandamus. It follows, therefore, that
the relator is entitled to have his claim for mileage as set forth in his petition audited and allowed
by the respondents as the state board of examiners." State v. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 Pac. 1071
(1908). (Emphasis added.)
The two cases involving the stenographer's claim for
mileage invite an interesting observation. In the first case
the court held that the Legislature as well as the courts
were powerless to interfere with the constitutional right
of the Board of Examiners to examine claims against the
State, and that, therefore, the claim for mileage reimbursement could not by-pass the Board irrespective of any contrary language in the statute authorizing payments for
such mileage. In the second case the court held that the
claim, once presented to the Board, must be audited and
paid if the statutory requirements are met, and that,
though the Board is a quasi-judicial body, it exercises no
judgment or discretion beyond that of a simple audit to
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ascertain the facts when the Legislature has set the standard for payment. Apparently then, the Legislature could
not by-pass the Board by directing that the State Auditor
pay by warrant upon receipt of a district judge's certification of miles traveled, but, on the other hand, the Board
could not add to nor detract from the requirements of the
statute, and while the Board has a constitutional right to
examine the claims, it is simply a constitutional right to
audit (ascertain facts but not exercise discretion) in those
areas where the Legislature has spelled out the criteria
for payment.
To this point (1908), after deciding Thoreson, Marioneaux, Edwards and Cutler, the court apparently had recognized in the Board a discretionary and quasi-judicial
constitutional power to examine all claims against the
State except salaries and compensation of officers fixed
by law, but that, when the Legislature specifically assigns
to the Board a stautory duty to receive, audit and allow
claims, the Board cannot exercise its constitutional discretion beyond a mechanical and ministerial examination to
determine that the facts surrounding the claim comply
with the legislative criteria for payment.
The next case to be decided bearing upon the discretionary power of the Board was Uintah State Bank v.
Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434 (1931). The plaintiff
sought mandamus to compel the State Auditor to draw
a warrant in payment of bounty claims for killing predatory animals. The Legislature had made an appropriation
for payment of such bounty claims and had prescribed a
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procedure for payment. Plaintiff, as assignee of the bounty
claim for 25 coyotes and 7 bobcats, presented the claim
in the statutory form and manner to the State Auditor for
payment, but the Auditor declined to draw his warrant on
the ground that an examination and approval of the claim
by the Board of Examiners was a constitutional prerequisite. The court was divided, with two of the five justices
joining in a vigorous dissenting opinion. Perhaps the holding of the court will be better clarified against the background of the dissenting opinion.
Justice Straup, joined by Justice Ephraim Hanson, dissented from the opinion of the court. Justice Straup reviewed the specific statutory procedures for obtaining
bounty payments, and then concluded :
"It thus is seen that by the act a complete procedure is provided for the presentation and payment
of bounty claims and all that is required to be done
to entitle the claimant to a warrant from the state
auditor. Such requirements necessarily negative a
presentation of the claim to the state board of examiners for its approval. * * *
"For thirty years claims for killing predatory
animals have been paid as by the act provided without presenting them to the board of examiners. Not
until now, to entitle the holder of a certificate to
a warrant or to authorize the state auditor to issue
a warrant in payment thereof, was it at any time
contended that such claims required presentation to
or approval by the board. * * *
"That the statute clearly permits and contemplates the issuing of warrants in payment of bounty
claims, without requiring the claims to be presented
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to and approved by the board, may not well be
doubted. No serious contention is made to the contrary. While in the prevailing opinion it is not expressly stated that the statute in such particular is
unconstitutional, yet the holding necessarily is to
that effect." (Emphasis added.)
Justice Straup then quoted Article VII, Section 13 of
the Constitution, relating to the Board of Examiners, and
argued that the only mandatory duty of the Board was to
pass upon claims prior to their presentation to the Legislature, and that, unless the Board so acted, the Legislature
was prohibited from acting:
"It is thus seen that the inhibition related only
to the Legislature, forbidding it to pass on any
claim against the state not considered and acted
on by the board of examiners. As to the board, the
Constitution but confers power on it to examine
all claims against the state, except salaries, etc., and
to perform such other duties as may be prescribed
by law."

Justice Straup next argued that the constitutional power of
the Board was intended to be only one of examining Hunliquidated" claims :
"When properly considered, I think the sections have no application to the character of claims
as here involved and which are to be paid not out
of public revenues or of a general fund, but as expressly provided are to be paid out of a special fund
created by the Legislature for a particular purpose,
and where by the act itself creating the fund, payment of claims and the manner of presenting and
paying them are specifically prescribed by the same
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act creating the fund and where the law itself fixes
the amount and manner of payment. * * *"
"This brings us to the constitutional provision.
Similar provisions by Idaho and Nevada were held
to embrace or include only claims of an unliquidated
character (citing Idaho and Nevada cases). I think
such is the proper construction of our provision.
State v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 P. 720, is ref erred to and relied on as supporting a contrary
doctrine and as an authority that the constitution
includes all claims, liquidated and unliquidated, except compensation and salaries of officers, etc., and
requires all claims against the state to be presented
to and approved by the board of examiners before
the state auditor is authorized to issue a warrant
in payment of them. In the opinion of that case
there is undoubted language to that effect. However, the claim there considered was unliquidated.
The facts recited in the opinion clearly show that;
the court in effect so stated. What the court decided with respect to such a claim constituted an
adjudication and a precedent of binding effect as
to unliquidated claims. What was said beyond that,
was mere dicta without binding effect." (Emphasis added.)
The opinion of the court, however, thought State v. Edwards was controlling. Mr. Justice Folland, joined by Justices Cherry and Elias Hansen, held :
"This decision (Edwards) we think controlling
in the present case. It follows, therefrom, from the
Constitution and statutes as thus construed, that
the bounty claims or certificates in question must
be presented to and approved by the board of examiners unless it appears that they are either not
'claims against the state' or that they represent 'sal-
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aries or compensation of officers fixed by law.' It
is not seriously contended that these are not claims
against the state, but, on the contrary, it is rather
assumed in the arguments and briefs of counsel
that they are. This could not well be otherwise.
That these are demands against the state seems
clear because the fund from which bounty claims
are paid is raised by taxation; the money is paid
into the state treasury, is subject to appropriation
by the Legislature, and is paid out by the state
treasurer on warrant of the state auditor. We see
no good reason why a fund raised by taxation for
a special purpose is not entitled to the same protection as is the general fund. That they are 'claims'
is equally clear." (Emphasis added.)
In response to the argument that the Constitution only intended the Board to examine "unliquidated" claims, the
court said:
"A complete answer to this argument is that
the Constitution makes no such exception. All claims
are subject to action by the board of examiners,
except only claims for 'salaries and compensation
of officers fixed by law.' The claims here are not
fixed by law in the sense that the Legislature has
made an appropriation of an amount certain to a
definite named person. It is true that a unit price
to be paid on certain animals as a bounty is fixed
by law, but before the claim is liquidated it must
be determined how many animals were killed,
where and within what county, and the pelts submitted must be examined and found to comply with
state statute. While the duty is imposed upon the
county clerk to make this examination and deliver
his certificate, it is no answer to the constitutional
requirement to say that the county clerk has audited
and examined the claim, and that that is sufficient.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

61
There could be no claim against the state for bounty
until the animals are killed and the pelts presented
to the county clerk. It is by the county clerk that
the claim is liquidated, not by the Legislature. May
the Legislature then, in the face of our constitutional provision, pass over the board of examiners
and set up some local agency by which claims may
be fixed and settled without any state officer having power to examine and approve or disapprove
such claim?
"If we should adopt petitioner's view, it would
follow that the Legislature might designate any
officer other than the board of examiners as authorized in behalf of the state to settle, fix, or liquidate
claims and agree upon the amount to be paid thereon, and thereby exclude the board of examiners
from its duty and responsibility with respect to
claims thus liquidated pursuant to legislative authority. We cannot agree to any such construction of
the constitutional language, nor may we by construction interpolate the word 'unliquidated' into
the Constitution so that it would provide that the
board of examiners have power to 'examine all unliquidated claims against the State,' etc. The Constitution has vested in the Board of Examiners the
power to examine and pass on all claims except
those exempted, and the Legislature is without
authority to delegate such power to any other board
or officer.

"*

*

*

"If the view is taken that the Legislature intended to make this claim payable by the auditor
without presentation to the board of examiners,
then the Legislature attempted to do that which it
had no power or authority to effectuate * * *."
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In the above discussion by the Court in the Uintah State
Bank case, it is made clear that the Legislature cannot
delegate to another officer or body the authority to "liquidate" claims, thus by-passing the Board of Examiners.
But, the court also refused to construe the constitutional
provision to mean only "unliquidated" claims. Therefore,
even if some officer were designated to liquidate claims,
it seems that such claims still must go to the Board of Examiners. Perhaps what the court really held was that a
claim properly liquidated by the Legislature (rather than
a subordinate public officer) must still be approved by the
Board, but that the Board has a much narrower range of
discretion in acting upon such properly liquidated claims.
Therefore, this range of discretion cannot be diminished
by a legislative delegation of the authority to liquidate
claims to another officer or board. To do so would be to
vest in another officer or agency the real discretionary
duties of the Board of Examiners, and would reduce the
Board to a mere auditing agent of the legislatively created agency. But, while the court strongly denounced any
authority in the Legislature to so delegate, it sustained in
the Legislature itself the authority to "liquidate" claims.
Further, while the court said that the "Constitution and
statutes" required the Board to examine claims, it did not
say whether it was the Constitution or the statutes which
established the requirement.
The next case decided by the court and dealing with
the Board of Examiners was Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247 P. 2d 435 (1952),
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wherein the plaintiff instituted an original proceeding in
the Supreme Court to compel the Commission of Finance
to issue warrants on the State Treasurer for payment of
salary claims of Dr. E. Allen Bateman. There is little discussion, and no specific holding, concerning the constitutional authority of the Board of Examiners. But, apparently one of the conditions precedent to payment of the
salary (whether a statutory or constitutional prerequisite)
was thought by the court to be approval of the Board of
Examiners:
"The Board of Examiners (composed of the
Governor, Secretary of State and the Attorney
General) which must approve all salary claims
against the State, except those fixed by law, approved by a vote of two to one the request of the
Board of Education to pay Dr. Bateman a salary
of $10,000.00 per annum." (Emphasis added.)
Despite the approval of the Board of Examiners, the Commission of Finance refused to pay because it questioned
the legality of the constituency of the Board of Education
and the appointment of Dr. Bateman. For reasons immaterial to this discussion, the court ordered the salary paid.
Suffice to say that the Board of Education case simply
recited that the Board of Examiners must examine and
approve salary claims, without specifying whether such
necessity was created under Article VII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, or under Title 63, Chapter 6 of the Code.
In March of 1956 the court decided University of Utah
Board of Examiners, et al., 4 U. 2d 408, 295 P. 2d 348
(1956), wherein the University challenged the authority

V.
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of the Commission of Finance, the Board of Examiners,
the Legislature and certain state officers to exercise financial or other control over the University. The contention
of the University was that it was an entity created by the
Constitution and was beyond the control of the State in
financial and fiscal matters. In a lengthy opinion, written
by Justice Worthen, the court rejected the position contended for by the University, holding the laws of the Legislature from time to time enacted to control the fiscal and
financial affairs of the University. The case really seemed
to be an argument between legislative control of the University versus an autonomous University. Therefore, the
position of the Board of Examiners as a constitutional entity did not get very clear treatment, and the decision is
of little help in clarifying the constitutional powers of the
Board. The case seemed to hold that the University is
subject to the Board of Examiners because the Legislature
has so providecf, but such a holding certainly fails to define
the constitutional authority of the Board of Examiners.
A further observation about the University of Utah
case is that the court, although unanimous in the result,
was far from unanimous as to the rationale. In fact, no
other judge concurred in Justice Worthen's opinion as written. Justices McDonough and Henriod concurred in the
result, and Justice Crockett concurred in a separate opinion, which was adopted by Justice Wade in his concurrence
in the result. Therefore, the statements made in the University case are not only unclear as to the position of the
Board of Examiners, but they also do not have the approval
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of any member of the court except the author of the opinion.
Early in 1958 the Supreme Court decided Bateman v.
Board of Examiners, 7 U. 2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381 (1958),
wherein the court sustained the power of the Board of Examiners and the Commission of Finance, as its administrative arm, to examine into and approve or disapprove proposed expenditures, including salary schedules, of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and Board of Education.
After quoting Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution,
the Court said :
"The question of importance is the extent of
the authority conferred by the language, '* * *
with power to examine all claims against the state.'
This phraseology has given rise to much concern
over the reciprocal powers and interrelationships
of the departments of our state government. In the
first place, we think that the word 'claim' was used
in its broadest connotation and we recognize that
it is susceptible of a variety of meanings; ranging
from a moral claim; or the seeking of legislative
largesse; or asserting a privilege; to asserting right
to compensation for property or materials furnished, or salary for services rendered, to the state.
But the pivot of the controversy has developed upon
the term 'to examine.' On the one hand, Education
espouses the view that the power 'to examine all
claims against the state, merely denotes an auditing
function; and on the other, Examiners takes the
position that it confers plenary power to examine
into the advisability and necessity of any expenditure or proposed obligation of the state.
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"The first facet of Education's argument
against the power claimed by Examiners is that
the framers of the Constitution envisioned Section
13, quoted above, as legislative in nature, intended
to be subsequently modified and controlled by legislative enactments such as the statutes conferring
powers on Education. They emphasize that such
was the plain import of its first clause, 'Until otherwise provided by law, * * *' which they insist modified the entire section. Without going into the detail of the arguments pro and con on this
facet of the subject it is readily seen that attempting to give that proviso application to each of the
subsequent parts of the section gives rise to some
difficulty grammatically. i.e., it would read: 'Until
otherwise provided by law, * * * (they shall)
* * * perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.' Absent knowledge of the facts concerning its adoption, the most natural meaning
would be that it applies only to the first sentence
dealing with the membership of the Board of State
Prison Commissioners, and by parallel reasoning, to
the second sentence relating only to the membership
of the Board of Examiners." (Emphasis added.)
Here, for the first time, the Court suggested that the composition of the Board of Examiners could be changed by the
Legislature. Does this mean that the Legislature could
replace all three of the present members (Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General) and provide for an
entirely different Board, perhaps with 5, 7 or 15 members?
Perhaps, or perhaps not. In any event, the court continued to make it reasonably clear (though only dictum) that
the composition of the Board could be changed :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

67

r·

"The idea that the boards themselves were to
be subject to change by the Legislature also finds
support in the practical construction which has been
placed upon it. The membership of all of the other
boards provided for in the sections just referred to
(of the Constitution) has now been changed. A
conclusion that the initial clause affects the entire
section would not cast the die in favor of Education
any more than it would in favor of Examiners, as
will appear from our discussion of the statute relating to the powers of the latter board. Yet it does
have an important bearing on the over-all conclusion we reach in this opinion, which is based to a
considerable extent upon the concept that the fundamental power of government rests in the legislature."

In the Bateman case the argument was again presented
that the Board of Examiners had constitutional authority
to pass only upon unliquidated claims against the State.
To this argument, the court responded :
"Certain it is that one of the functions of Examiners is to investigate and act as a fact finder
and advisor to the legislature on claims of that nature, such as tort claims, or other claims for damages or compensation claimed for property, goods or
services, by persons who would not otherwise have
legal redress available.
"One of the major difficulties with Education's
contention that, except as to unliquidated claims
against the state, Examiners has no discretionary
authority and can perform only an auditing function, is that that would be but a duplication of the
duties of the state auditor who is charged with the
responsibility of auditing the records and accounts
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of all departments of state government. The question as to the extent of the power of Examiners has
been dealt with by this court in numerous decisions.
They clearly demonstrate that Examiners has powers beyond mere auditing." (Emphasis added.)
The court then went on to note that the Legislature, itself,
had recognized the constitutional discretionary power of
the Board of Examiners, as demonstrated by various acts
of the Legislature:
"This interpretation of the law is also consonant with the legislative conception of the powers
of that board. They provide for the presentation
of all claims against the state to the Board of Examiners to be passed upon; that it has certain supervisory powers over the Auditor; and the unanimous
consent of its members is required before officers
of the state may make deficit expenditures. It is
expressly provided that the Department of Finance,
the legislatively created administrative arm of the
Board of Examiners, is endowed with authority to
approve or disapprove of the hiring of all personnel, * * * "
However, the court conceded that, in large part, it was
controlled by the past history of governmental function and
by earlier decisions of the court, indicating that, if the
question were one of first impression, the Board of Examiners might emerge in a different light:
"Were we interpreting the statutes and constitutional provisions relating to the Board of Examiners for the first time we might be more impressed
by arguments proposed by Education. However,
history and experience have always been the very
bone and sinew of the law. As stated by the great
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Justice Holmes: 'The Life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience.'
"Looking at the problems here presented in
broad perspective it is important to realize that our
legislature has met biennially and in special sessions
for many years with both the statutory and decisional law of this state being so understood and
applied that in practical operation the Examiners
and Finance have exercised general supervisory
powers over the fiscal and budgetary affairs of
other departments of state government and no substantial changes have been made in the law in reference thereto.

"On the basis of the constitutional provisions,
legislative enactments and decisional law of our
state as it has developed, we are constrained to reject the contention of Education that it is entirely
free from control of or responsibility to Examiners.
We do not desire to be understood as saying that
Examiners can go so far as to in effect exercise a
veto power over legislation by arbitrarily refusing
to make funds available which have been appropriated to Education for either general or specific
purposes. Insofar as this has been done in certain
instances which had considerable bearing upon precipitating this litigation, such actions were wrong.
But inasmuch as the funds in question have reverted to the general fund, and the problems are
now moot, there is no point in particularizing them.
(Emphasis added.)
"Notwithstanding the powers conferred upon
Examiners by the statutes hereinabove discussed,
which must be recognized, that does not mean that
it can by arbitrary actions in budgetary matters
intrude into the internal affairs of management or
control of the functions of Education within the
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purview of its purpose as provided by law. The
latter alone is given the authority and charged with
the duty of the 'administration of the system of
public instruction' in the schools of the state. In
order to discharge that responsibility it is essential,
and the law contemplates, that it have full control
of the framing of policy and other aspects of the
internal management of that department in accordance with such purpose." (Emphasis added.)
The most recent case decided by the court and touching upon the powers of the Board of Examiners is Wood
V. Budge, 13 U. 2d 359, 374 P. 2d 516 (1962), wherein the
Board had examined and rejected certain unliquidated
claims, and the Legislature subsequently appropriated to
the Attorney General money to pay the claims upon securing appropriate releases. The Attorney General refused
to pay the claims until a judicial declaration was had to
determine the propriety of a legislative grant to pay an
unliquidated claim rejected by the Board. In requiring the
Attorney General to pay in accordance with the statutory
appropriation, the court said :
"We are in accord with the defendant's assertion that the constitutional grant of authority 'to
examine all claims against the State' gives the
Board something more than an auditing duty to
perform; and that within its proper preregative it
has extensive power and discretion in examining
into and determining the merits of claims asserted
against the State. We so observed in the recent
case of Bateman v. Board of Examiners, after quite
thoroughly considering the problem and our cases
which have dealt with it. * * *
"The provision of Section 13 of Article VII,
quoted above, that '* * * no claim * * *
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shall be passed upon by the Legislature without
having been considered and acted upon by the said
Board of Examiners' plainly indicates that the action of the Board was not intended to be so final
and absolute as to preclude other action by the Legislature. We can perceive no other meaning than
that after the Board has performed its duty of examining and acting upon such claims, the Legislature may then 'pass upon,' i.e., exercise its judgment, on them and take such action as it deems
appropriate. Entirely in harmony with this conclusion are : our statutory provision that 'any person
who is aggrieved by disapproval of such a claim by
the Board (Examiners) may appeal therefrom to
the legislature'; the prior decisions of this court
that have touched upon the matter; and the practice which has been followed since statehood. To
decide otherwise would produce the illogical result
of turning the subsequent presentation of claims to
the Legislature into an empty gesture whose only
purpose would be to rubber-stamp the action of the
Board." (Emphasis added.)
It would seem that the court's conclusion does not necessarily follow from its argument. Certainly, if the Legislature only considered those claims recommended for approval by the Board, the Legislature could still exercise its
discretion in approving or rejecting the claims previously
examined and recommended by the Board, and there would
be no compulsion upon it to appropriate money to pay
claims recommended for approval by the Board. Further,
the statutory provision for appeal to the Legislature on
all claims rejected by the Board can hardly have persuasive
weight as to the intent of the framers of the Constitution.
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Nevertheless, the court so held, apparently adopting
the concept that in areas of doubt or question as to constitutional jurisdiction, the uncertainty should be resolved
in favor of the Legislature:
"There is another principle which bears upon
the question here under consideration. Our Legislature is directly representative of the people of the
sovereign state, and thus has inherently all of the
powers of government except as otherwise specified
by the State Constitution. By way of comparison, it
is significantly different in that respect from the
federal government, which is a government of limited powers that can properly do only those things
within the scope of the powers expressly granted to
it by the states through the Federal Constitution;
whereas, the State Legislature, having the residuum
of governmental power, does not look to the State
Constitution for the grant of its powers, but that
Constitution only sets forth the limitations on its
authority. Therefore, it can do any act or perform
any function of government not specifically prohibited by the State Constitution. In order to justify
a conclusion that the power to approve and pay
such claims has been taken away from the Legislature and placed exclusively within the control of
the Board of Examiners, it would have to clearly
so appear, which is not the case here."
Having held that all such claims, whether approved or rejected by the Board, could properly pass to the Legislature
for its disposition of them, the court suggested that the
decision of the Board should be given careful consideration
by the Legislature, and that if the Legislature appropriated
money to pay claims in areas where the state would not be
liable, even absent its sovereign immunity, perhaps the
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appropriation would be a gift of public funds, and the
court would have the final say as to whether the claim
could be paid :
"Although the privilege is not ours to pass upon the wisdom of legislative action, we think it not
amiss to point out that due to the extent of its
powers as to such claims, the Legislature should
regard its responsibility as correspondingly grave;
and should bear in mind these facts: That the duty
of examining into claims against the State was undoubtedly given to the Board of Examiners because
the officers comprising it can be assumed to be acquainted with the fiscal affairs of the State and
to have a high sense of responsibility therefor; that
the Board has better facilities at its command for
investigation and inquiry into such matters than
has the Legislature, including the fact that the Attorney General as the State's legal advisor was
made a member of the Board purposely so that he
and his staff could be of help in determining
whether an asserted 'claim' against the State has
any valid foundation, or whether it is simply a request for a gift or some other meritless attempt to
obtain public funds, masquerating under the guise
of such a 'claim.'
"For these reasons it is unquestionable that
this function of the Board of Examiners was intended to be regarded as an important one; and that
it is the legislative duty to give serious consideration to its recommendations to the end that such
claims be acted upon with prudence and wisdom
to best serve the interests of the whole State and
to avoid making grants in cases where the State
should assume no responsibility."
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If the framers of the Constitution "purposely" made
the Attorney General, as the State's legal advisor, a member of the Board to provide legal advice as to the claims,
and if the framers "undoubtedly" named the Governor and
Secretary of State to the Board because of their familiarity
with the fiscal affairs of the State, then one cannot help
but contrast this dictum as to the composition of the Board
with the dictum of Bateman, which suggests that the Legislature could change the composition of the Board at its
will, naming a Board with no legal advisors and having
no person familiar with the fiscal affairs of the state.
Justice Henriod, concurring in the result and stating
separately his opinion, seems to concur in the main opinion's reference to the intent of the framers of the Constitution in making the Attorney General a member of the
Board:
"It seems obvious to this writer that the Board
of Examiners was a creature of its constitutional
parents, who deliberately and with wisdom designed it to include the highest elected legal officer
of the State. Also obvious, it seems, is that such
officer was made a member of the Board to determine if a so-called 'claim' really is one against the
State, or whether it simply is a request for a gift
inaccurately called a 'claim,' or some other illegitimate petition for funds.

"Furthermore, the decision of the Board, after
it has 'passed upon' a 'claim' should be overridden
by the Legislature only upon a clear showing that
its action wholly was arbitrary and capricious. Any
arbitrary and capricious action of either the Board
or the Legislature itself in effectuating any action
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beyond its recognized functions would be subject to
judicial review in an appropriate proceeding." (Emphasis added.)
Justice Henriod, in his separate opinion, stated that no
issues were really before the court in the Wood case except whether, as a matter of procedure, the claims should
be paid by the Attorney General. But under the test set
forth by Justice Henriod, the Legislature could only appropriate money to pay a claim rejected by the Board if
the Board's action had been arbitrary or capricious. Thus,
to phrase the matter another way, if the Legislature did
appropriate money to pay a claim reasonably rejected by
the Board, then the action of the Legislature would be arbitrary and would be stricken in an appropriate proceeding for judicial review.
But the opinion of the court seemed to suggest a different test, stating simply that the Legislature should give
careful consideration to the action of the Board, and implying that the court might be called upon to invalidate legislative grants if they amounted to a private gift of public
funds.
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